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On December 2010, five research teams gathered in Santiago, Chile, to 
discuss the growth experiences of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela since independence from Spain was declared in 1810. The five 
teams answered an invitation from the editors of the Latin American Journal 
of Economics to explain why these countries’ growth experiences lag so 
far behind those of the developed world, and at the same time, why their 
trajectories have been so dissimilar. This paper serves as an introduction 
to the special issue, characterizing the patterns of growth in Latin America, 
and discussing the teams’ answers.
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1.  introduction
The papers in this volume deal with the economic experience of 
the five Latin American countries that declared independence from 
Spain in 1810: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Independence, nevertheless, was not achieved until the end of the 
decade, when Spanish troops were finally defeated in Argentina and 
Chile (1818), Colombia (1819), and in Mexico and Venezuela (1821). 
As of 2010, these five economies comprised around 45% of total GDP 
in Latin America and 42% of population and represented the most 
developed of all countries in the region. Absent from this group is 
Latin America’s giant economy—Brazil—which gained independence 
from Portugal only in 1822. 
Year 2010 marked two centuries of political and economic independence 
in these countries. The occasion invited social scientists to make a 
long-run assessment of development in Latin America and address the 
underlying question of why economic growth has been mediocre, elusive, 
Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 113–132114 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 113–132
and highly unstable, while developed countries and the emerging Asian 
economies have been able to deliver, to a large extent, the promise 
of material welfare for the vast majority of their inhabitants. This 
project is the response to such opportunity.
The challenge to the participants in this project was to move beyond 
the mere account of facts and anecdotes into the rigorous testing of 
well-founded economic theories. Economics in Latin America has a 
long history of explanations for its economic phenomena, a history 
in which rigorous testing of hypothesis is largely absent and data 
is merely used for illustrative purposes. As aptly expressed in one 
of the papers in this volume, the statistical analysis of past data is 
as valuable as history repeats itself, but to move forward one needs 
to test a theory. Using different, ingenuous and novel theoretical 
frameworks the authors of the papers in this volume set out to 
discuss the salient aspects of development (or lack thereof) of each 
country: taken as a whole they provide a compelling diagnosis of 
Latin America’s development path and, implicitly, they show us the 
type of policies our countries require to foster sustainable economic 
growth and higher welfare levels.
Undoubtedly, the explanations provided in these five papers are a significant 
contribution to our understanding of sustainable development and the 
role of economic policies. At the same time, these papers provide only 
partial answers to the pressing needs of Latin American development. 
But as such, they are solid stepping stones for future research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an 
overview of the last two centuries in Latin America. Section 3 discusses 
common aspects of the conclusions in the other five papers in this 
issue. Section 4 concludes.
2.  a quick look at Latin america’s first  
two centuries since independence:  
The disappointing facts
Economic development after independence in these five countries, as 
well as in the rest of Latin America, has been rather disappointing 
(Andre Hofman, 2000; Dominique Hachette, 2011). Economic growth 
has been slow, wealth inequality substantial and economic and political 
instability pervading. Progress has undoubtedly been made: as of 2010 
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by the World Bank (2011). However, at times such progress has been 
too slow to provide lasting solutions to the pressing demands of our 
societies thus fueling social unrest and political turmoil. At others, 
progress has been fast enough to raise hopes, only to show at later 
stages that it was indeed unsustainable and ephemeral. Instability 
in economic growth as well as in political life is a defining trait of 
Latin America’s development. Disappointment with economic growth 
in Latin America is amplified by the successful development of East 
Asian economies in the 1980s and 1990s and, more recently, China 
(World Bank, 2001). 
At the times of independence, nevertheless, Latin American economies 
were not in disadvantage to achieve economic development. In Table 
1 it can be seen that, according to estimates by Angus Maddison 
(2006), as of 1820 Chile and Mexico had per-capita income levels 
that were around one half that of European economies and the US. 
Venezuela lagged slightly behind. Data for Colombia and Argentina 
are not available but one could safely assume that income levels in 
Colombia were not markedly different to the other three Latin American 
economies, while that of Argentina is estimated as equivalent to the 
US in James Coatsworth (2008). In fact, income levels in these Latin 
American countries seem to have been typical for non-European 
economies: Maddison estimates indicate that all Asian economies—
from Malaysia to India and China—had income levels very similar to 
Chile and Mexico and also that the world average was not significantly 
different. The very low income level of Singapore reflects that it had 
only been founded in 1819 by Thomas Raffles and amounted to little 
more than a British overseas trading post.
Historians tend to agree that there was a decline in income per-capita 
in Latin American countries relative to Europe between 1750 and 
1850 (Coatsworth, 2008) although estimates of economic activity 
are scarce and imprecise. Independence would then locate at the end 
of a declining period. Explanations for such decline point mainly at 
the poor quality of institutions: Iberian colonialism failed to create 
dynamic societies that could independently generate technological 
or organizational innovation. Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. 
Sokoloff (1997) pose that institutions designed for the exploitation 
of Latin America’s natural resources (large slave plantations in 
the tropics and large grain and cattle haciendas elsewhere) led to 
wealth concentration and unequal societies in which settler elites 
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These colonial arrangements—which persisted long past the end of 
colonial rule—were not amenable to competition and productive 
investment as they protected the property rights of elites, but denied 
such protections to powerless subordinate classes. Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001) deny the importance 
of natural resource endowments and pose that inequality stem from 
the enactment of extractive institutions by settler elites designed to 
dominate large populations of native or African descent. Again, these 
“extractive institutions” deliberately excluded majorities from power 
and failed to protect their property and human rights, thus leading 
to low investment in human and physical capital. Matthew Lange, 
James Mahoney and Matthias vom Hau’s (2006) theory points at the 
differences between colonial rulers, whereby institutions stemming from 
“mercantilism” in Spain were inimical to growth as opposed to those 
arising from “liberalism” in Britain. Accordingly, major institutional 
or policy constraints that inhibited economic growth in both Spain 
and its colonies include the burdensome Spanish legal system, the 
political risk of confiscation or other losses, the slow rate of human 
capital formation, and anti-trade policies.
Coatsworth (2008) correctly points out that these explanations do 
not match the data and are inadequate to explain the slow growth 
of the first fifty years after independence for a variety of reasons. 
First, income inequality in Latin America was not different to that 
in North America. Second, productivity differences between the 
richest and poorest Latin American colonies in the early 1800s were 
nearly as great as for the richest and poorest regions of the entire 
world and seem to be entirely unrelated to subsequent economic 
success or failure. Third, because Latin American countries were 
not in disadvantage in 1820, it seems that institutions mattered for 
development only after independence. Fourth, and more importantly, 
there is little evidence that settler elites were able to dominate 
colonial administrations, control policy making, or shape institutions 
just as they pleased. 
Independence did not necessarily bring political stability to Latin 
American countries, with the exception of Chile where a unitary 
republic was in place already by 1830. In some countries—such as 
Argentina and Colombia—internal conflicts were not solved until 
around 1860. In other countries, internal conflicts were reinforced by 
territorial disputes with neighboring countries (e.g., Mexico) that were 
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By 1870, half a century after independence, these five Latin American 
economies had entered a period of political control of internal affairs, 
enacted significant liberalization reforms and, benefiting from favorable 
external conditions, resumed sustained growth. European countries and 
the US, in the meantime, had taken full advantage of industrialization 
and progressed to the point of doubling income per capita to around 
US$ 2,000. Some Latin American countries—Argentina and Chile—
managed to keep pace with advanced economies in terms of relative 
income levels, while Mexico and Venezuela remained as stagnant 
as all Asian economies (the significant exception is Singapore that 
had already caught up with regional levels). Interestingly, evidence 
for Spain in Table 1 indicates it performed less dynamically that its 
ex-colonies and its income level grew very slowly, reaching around 
one half of that in the US and not significantly different of those in 
Argentina and Chile.
Table 1. real GDP per capita
(Geary-Khamis International Dollars of 1990)
1820 1870 1920 1970 2010
Argentina 1,311 3,473 7,302 11,886
Chile 694 1,290 2,768 5,231 13,490
Colombia 1,255 3,094 6,445
Mexico 759 674 1,823 4,320 7,732
Venezuela 460 569 1,173 10,672 9,599
Europe* 1,234 2,080 3,313 10,925 21,436
Spain 1,008 1,207 2,212 6,319 18,091
USA 1,257 2,445 5,552 15,030 30,543
China 600 530 778 8,931
India 533 533 635 868 3,397
South Korea 600 604 1,092 2,167 20,771
Thailand 570 608 1,694 9,088
Taiwan 550 550 861 2,537 24,484
Hong Kong 615 683 5,695 32,537
Malaysia 603 663 1,110 2,079 10,515
Singapore 83 682 4,439 28,090
World 666 870 3,726 6,874
Source: Maddison, Contours of the World Economy 1-2030 AD, for the period 1820-2006 and World 
Bank, World Development Indicators, for the period 2007-2010. 
Note: (*) includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.118 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 113–132
One hundred years after effective independence, economic growth in Latin 
American economies continued steady but countries started to diverge. 
On one hand, Argentina seemed to be on a pace of fast development 
and had reached income levels as high as the main European countries 
and around 50% higher than Spain. Vigorous economic growth in Chile, 
on the other hand, started to lose steam after 1900 and could not 
follow pace with the rapid growth of Argentina, managing to achieve 
income levels only around 25% higher than Spain but still well below 
Europe or the US levels. Mexico experienced accelerated growth since 
1870 but its initial low income level only allowed the economy to 
catch-up to around 50% of European standards. Likewise, Venezuela 
and Colombia which have stayed initially behind managed to grow 
systematically but not to close the gap vis-à-vis Europe and the US.
As discussed by all papers in this volume, the Great Depression of 
the 1930s marked a decisive change in economic policy and long run 
growth. The negative shock was very significant in Chile, Mexico 
and Venezuela with per-capita GDP dropping in the range of 20% to 
30%, but it affected less Argentina and Colombia. Figure 1 plots the 
cyclical component of GDP per-capita defined as the deviations from 
trend (the latter obtained as customary using Hodrick and Prescott’s 
filter with the smooth parameter set at 100). It can be seen that, in 
addition to the Great Depression downturn, Argentina and Colombia 
had been also affected by negative shocks in the early 1920s resulting 
from the post-World War I adjustment. In response to the decline in 
exports and protracted recession, Latin American economies closed 
their economies and embarked in massive programs of public investment 
in support of import substitution and the development of domestic 
manufacturing industries.
The import substitution experiment ran for about four decades in all 
economies but Venezuela. By the end of the 1960s it had ran out of 
momentum and the numerous distortions it induced had become a 
heavy burden for Latin American economies. In addition, the massive 
restructuring of the economies under the import substitution strategy 
led to mounting social tensions that expressed in increasing political 
instability (Edwards, 2009). Between 1930 and 1970, income per-capita 
grew at around 1.5% per year in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Colombia, 
a very similar rate to that of the previous fifty years. However, the 
post-World War II period was one of accelerated growth in the world 
(over 2% per year in the period 1950-1970) and, in particular, in Europe 
and the US (both with annual rates of 2.6% on average). Real income 119 R. Soto and F. Zurita | LATIN AMERICA AT ITS BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION
figure 1. economic cycles




per-capita tripled in advanced economies while it only doubled in these 
four Latin American countries: consequently, while in 1920 income per-
capita in these Latin American countries was on average at around 70% 
of European levels, by 1970 it had reduced to only 45%. 
Slow growth during the import substitution experiment was, nevertheless, 
accompanied by significantly lower levels of volatility in Argentina, 
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this volume also document the slow growth in labor productivity that 
characterizes the period of import substitution. And while economic 
cycles may have ameliorated, increasing instability showed in other 
dimensions of the economy. In particular, the main Latin American 
countries in the second half of the 20th century became the epitome 
of chronically high inflation and structural massive unemployment.
Venezuela, on the other hand, benefited enormously from the discovery 
and extraction of oil in Maracaibo in 1922 and became the richest 
economy of the region. By 1929, Venezuela was the second largest oil 
producing country (behind only the United States) and the largest oil 
exporter in the world. With such a dramatic development of the industry, 
income levels expanded extraordinarily but as the oil sector began to 
dominate all other economic sectors in the country other industries 
receded dramatically. The paper by Bello, Blyde and Restuccia in this 
volume documents how substantial oil revenues were initially used to 
build infrastructure and basic industries thus fostering growth, but later 
massively misused hampering economic growth and productivity gains.
While Latin American countries were enthusiastically embarking on 
import-substitution policies, East Asian countries chose the exact 
opposite strategy (World Bank, 2001). And while in Latin America 
economic growth languished, countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore 
managed to grow at astonishing rates. Table 1 provides the evidence 
of such remarkable growth: by 1970 both state-economies had already 
caught up with Latin American countries, while Korea, Malaysia, and 
Taiwan were already taking off.
In all papers in this volume, the authors find evidence of a significant 
break in trend in economic growth during the 1970s. The nature of such 
break, however, is not common to all economies. On one hand, Chile 
successfully implemented a series of pro-market reforms and managed 
to grow at much faster pace than during the import-substitution years: 
between 1970 and 2010, the economy grew at annual rates over 2.2% 
and closed significantly the gap with European countries. In fact, as 
of 2010 per-capita income in Chile had reached around 75% of that in 
Spain, a country that had made a complete turnaround in performance 
to fully embrace European standards. In Mexico, similar reforms were 
enacted but their impact has been less significant. On the other hand, 
the break in trend for other economies has been quite negative, in 
particular for Argentina and Venezuela, which sloped into economic 
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Income per capita in Argentina expanded quite slowly at 0.9% per 
year and the economy has experienced three hyperinflations and two 
major external crises (1989 and 2001). In Venezuela, income per capita 
declined in absolute terms. In Colombia and Mexico, the sustained 
growth of the import-substitution strategy gave way to a long and 
protracted stagnation, in particular in the “lost decade” of the 1980s.
The disillusion with economic growth and development strategies in 
Latin America is amplified by the contrasting experiences of East 
Asian economies, first, and India and China more recently. The last 
column in Table 1 presents the evidence: by 2010, East Asian tigers 
had income levels well above Latin American countries and emerging 
economies had already closed the gap. Early birds, such as Hong Kong 
and Singapore, had already achieved or surpassed the income levels 
of Europe and the US. Even backward economies of the 1970s such 
as China and Thailand had already advanced to the level of Mexico 
and Venezuela.
The dismal performance of most Latin American countries after the 
1970s is puzzling, in particular vis-à-vis other emerging economies. The 
contrast of Chile’s experience vis-à-vis Argentina or Venezuela indicates 
that apparently there is no common cause. However, as the papers in 
this volume indicate, economic policy seems to have played a major role.
3.  insights from five dissimilar trajectories
Methodologically, all papers in this volume look at the development 
process through the glass of a standard Solow-type model with 
exogenous growth, namely, models where gross domestic product 




where Kt is capital, Lt labor and where At is total factor productivity 
(TFP). Economic growth would be, then, the result of capital 
accumulation, expansions in the use of manpower, and changes 
in productivity, i.e., improvements in the efficiency of use of such 
resources. In general, the latter responds to changes in the technology 
that is available in worldwide markets—whose long-run trend growth 
is customarily assumed to be constant in long-run analysis—as well as 
changes in domestic elements such as institutions, government policies, 
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Once taken into account the contribution of capital and labor, the 
papers concentrate in analyzing deviations of TFP growth from that 
long-run trend. While each of the papers focuses on different aspects 
of the development path in each economy, a different time period, 
or a different idiosyncratic fact, there is a remarkable commonality 
among studies: they are all able to associate periods of productivity 
slowdown or stagnation to broad economic policies.
3.1. argentina: fiscal irresponsibility 
Francisco Buera, Gastón Navarro and Juan Pablo Nicolini discuss 
the case of Argentina. They start by decomposing the evolution of 
real per-capita GDP into trend and cyclical components. An annual 
growth rate in per-capita GDP of around 1.2% is considered by the 
authors as a reasonable approximation to the long-run trend of the 
economy and is also consistent with Maddison’s estimates in Table 
1. From the volatility of the cyclical component, they identify three 
distinctive periods in the economic history of the country (in concordance 
with our Figure 1). The first one starts in 1885 and ends with the 
unveiling of the Great Depression in 1930. The second period, which 
is characterized by much lower volatility, ends in 1974 while the third 
one, which comprises the last 35 years, shows a return to the higher 
volatility levels of the period 1885-1930. Although the differences in 
volatility of these three periods may be of importance (for example, 
Does increased volatility reduce growth?), they are not thoroughly 
explored in this paper.
The authors prefer to concentrate on the basic insight of the 
paper, namely, that there is quantitative and qualitative evidence 
of a significant break in the trend of GDP after 1974 and that this 
phenomenon is largely the result of fiscal mismanagement. Using a 
calibrated Solow-type growth model, they show that economic growth 
in Argentina in the period 1950-1974 is congruent with a calibrated 
economy in which total factor productivity (TFP) grows at around 
1.1% per year. However, after 1974 the data can only be replicated if 
the model is simulated from 1950 onwards with zero growth in TFP. 
In other words, per-capita growth in Argentina after 1974 has been 
so low that its current situation is the same to what could have been 
achieved if there had been no productivity growth whatsoever in the 
last 50 years. The economic development of Argentina, accordingly, 
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Argentina’s break in trend is not unique and it has been documented 
before for 12 Latin American economies (Andres Solimano and 
Raimundo Soto, 2006). What sets apart this paper from the previous 
literature is that it provides a causal economic explanation for the 
phenomenon. Buera et al. (2011) use the simple mechanics of Thomas 
Sargent’s (1983) model of government financing to show how in 
periods when the Argentinean government had access to financing, 
it had inevitably borrowed beyond what was sustainable and, once 
loans were no longer available, the government had defaulted and 
the economy had gone through a costly and lengthy period of 
adjustment. Crisis years are those where fiscal deficits have reached 
peak levels. A government without recourse to loans is forced to 
default. But was the Argentinean government finance-constrained 
at the times of crisis? As discussed by the authors, the discipline 
of Sargent’s model indicates the need to consider not only actual 
debt levels but also contingent debts when discussing government 
financing. In particular, contingent debts arose as a result of deposit 
guarantees in the financial sector and exchange rate insurance. When 
such adjustment is made, it becomes clear that the Argentinean 
government was very limited in access to financing precisely in those 
years when crises happened. Fiscal mismanagement produced large 
fiscal deficits that, inevitably, went beyond the financing capacity 
of the government. In turn, this forced the government to default 
on its debt and monetize the deficits, leading to hyperinflation in 
1975, 1985 and 1989 and to massive wealth expropriation in 2001.
3.2. chile: import substitution 
The paper by Rodrigo Fuentes on Chile also points out to the existence 
of “structural breaks,” i.e., abrupt changes in the contribution of 
the different determinants of long-run growth as a result of shocks 
that can have long-lasting effects. However, contrary to the other 
studies, he benefits from the availability of long series on the major 
macroeconomic variables covering the period 1810-2010. Therefore, 
the author is able to undertake formal tests for the hypotheses of 
trend breaks and confirm the observations made by other authors of 
a significant break in GDP trend in 1929—undoubtedly related to the 
Great Depression and the ensuing import-substitution strategy—and 
also in the early 1970s. Fuentes notices that after 1929 the Chilean 
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1820-1930. Contrary to the cases of Argentina and Colombia, the 
Great Depression hit Chile very hard: the author suggests that per-
capita income in Chile did not return to the path predicted by its 
pre-1930 economic trajectory but until the early 1990s. 
Undoubtedly, the reasons for such a long period of stagnation ought 
to lie beyond the obviously transitory effects of the depression. 
Fuentes develops a formal theory of economic activity that, under 
mild assumptions, provides a rigorous framework to test for the 
presence of such shocks. He finds that the three sub-periods roughly 
correspond to those in Figure 1. Notably, long-run growth in the 
period 1930-1971 is slightly higher than that of the period 1830-1930 
and one would be tempted to claim that the import-substitution 
strategy paid Chile dearly. Yet, the dismantling of such strategy 
and the ensuing boost to private entrepreneurship allowed Chile to 
expand economic growth at unprecedented levels, comparable to that 
in East Asian economies. This, according to the author, explains the 
significant catch-up of Chile’s economy.
It is interesting to notice that, while in Argentina and Venezuela 
government policies are at the root of their dismal economic 
performance since the mid-1970s, Chile portrays the exactly opposite 
phenomenon. Policy reforms enacted since 1975 and consolidated in 
the 1980s and 1990s are, according to Fuentes, the main reason for 
the turnaround of the Chilean economy. In particular, he assigns a key 
role to international trade as a catalyst for foreign direct investment 
and innovation, exactly the opposite story as that of Argentina and 
Venezuela. But international trade has actually a second but very 
important role: foreign trade—in particular on natural resources—has 
been a major source of tax revenue. 
Indeed, in Fuentes’ analysis, the two structural breaks are no longer 
present in the data after controlling for openness-related variables 
and government expenditure. This finding hints at those policies as 
major determinants of deviations in TFP growth from the (catching 
up) long run trend.
3.3. colombia’s protracted backwardness
Álvaro Riascos discusses the notorious “textbook” case of Colombia. 
He shows that Colombia’s development history can be divided in 
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the classical Malthusian development stage where growth is driven 
primarily by factor accumulation (land and labor) and largely 
characterized by the absence of productivity gains. As expected, 
zero TFP growth implies a subsequent steady decline of per-capita 
GDP as compared to the levels of the industrialized world. The 
second stage, starting about 1910, is characterized by a catching up 
process of the Solow kind where productivity gains are a significant 
contributor to sustained economic growth. However, the catch-up 
phase seems to be very slow, as per capita GDP in Colombia is still 
about a quarter of that of the UK.
Riascos’ (2011) analysis points towards productivity as the main 
source of differences. Contrary to other papers in this literature, he 
extends Gary Hansen and Edward Prescott’s (2002) model which 
allows key macroeconomic variables to be endogenously determined 
(e.g., capital and TFP) thus bypassing the lack of data that is 
pervasive when testing long-run theories of economic growth in 
Latin America. The author calibrates the model to the Colombian 
data using as benchmark the UK in its Malthusian period (i.e., 
pre 1840). In order to match the data, initial productivity levels 
in Colombia had to be around one third of those observed in 
the UK. That is, since independence Colombia had a significant 
“technological backwardness” relative to the developed economies. 
Such backwardness made unprofitable an early (endogenous) switch 
to Solow-type growth: had productivity differences been lower, 
Colombian industrialization would have taken place before 1910. 
Interestingly, after 1910 Colombia has been unable to catch up 
with the UK income levels indicating the existence of technological 
differences also in the period of TFP-driven economic growth.
While useful, the Hansen and Prescott model cannot provide an 
explanation for the initial backwardness of Colombia or the lack of 
significant catch-up effects after 1910. Riascos reviews the explanations 
provided by researchers in other papers and is able to discard several 
of them on the basis that they are unlikely related to TFP levels or 
dynamics. However, he is able to link, albeit anecdotally, TFP levels 
with the comparatively dismal levels of education in Colombia in the 
early 1920s. Likewise, he assigns importance to the protracted civil 
conflict and their deleterious effect on institutions as likely causes of 
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3.4. Venezuela: Barriers to free enterprise
Venezuela’s case differs from the other four economies in many aspects. 
First and foremost, Venezuela has vast oil reserves. Mexico is the only 
other oil exporter but its share in exports and economic activity has 
been less significant. Second, the import-substitution strategy (ISS) 
was implemented much later and with different intensity in Venezuela 
vis-à-vis Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. In the latter, the ISS 
started to take shape in 1950s but had exhausted herself by the mid 
1970s. In Venezuela, it gained momentum only after the nationalization 
of gas and oil industries in the mid 1970s, became the dominant actor in 
economic life in the 1980s and it has been furthered in the last decade.
As discussed by Omar Bello, Juan Blyde and Diego Restuccia, following 
a period of stagnation that comprised most of the 19th century, 
Venezuela achieved extraordinary growth after the 1920s as the result 
of the development of the oil industry. Initially, the government used 
Venezuela’s newly found wealth to invest in infrastructure and to 
finance an ambitious program of investment in key industries such 
as electricity and coal. Tax revenues on foreign-owned oil companies 
provided the government with the necessary cash-flow for these 
projects. This initial stage of government-financed development gave 
way in the mid 1970s to full-fledged government intervention in the 
economy after oil companies were nationalized. Additional massive 
revenues began to flow to the government coffers with the sustained 
increase in oil prices in the late 1970s and 1980.
Contrary to other Latin American countries that had already started 
reforms, government intervention in the Venezuelan economy increased 
systematically after 1975. By the early 1980s, the government controlled 
80% of investment and around 30% of GDP. The result of this massive 
intervention is scrutinized in detail by Bello et al. (2011) using a growth 
accounting method and the US economy as benchmark. Needless to say, 
the US economy is a tough comparator for any country. Nevertheless, 
the authors show that by 1958 Venezuela had an income per-capita 
which was 82% of that of the US and that the difference was not the 
result of it being less efficient or engage in lower effort, but from the 
lower participation of the population in the labor force. By 2009, income 
per capita had declined to 32% and productivity levels in Venezuela 
were around 40% of those in the US. Their conclusion is that lower 
total factor productivity and lower capital accumulation are at the 
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proceeds of oil were largely misallocated. Note that contrary to the 
rest of Latin American countries in the period 1970-2010, Venezuela 
experienced a decline in GDP per-capita in absolute terms and not 
only vis-à-vis developed economies.
The sources of such notable stagnation are the focus and main contribution 
of the paper by Bello and co-authors. They disaggregate resource 
misallocation into three components. First, misallocation arising from 
the deliberate attempt of the government to move production away 
from oil and the limitations to private sector participation. Second, 
the massive misallocation of public funds to non-profitable investments 
following the 1974 oil price shock. Third, the direct market intervention 
in support of import-substitution and widespread price controls.
The authors develop a calibrated model of the Venezuelan economy 
based on Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) that allows them to study 
firm entry, employment and capital accumulation in an environment 
characterized by heterogeneity in productivity levels. They show first 
that high entry-costs in Venezuela—roughly six times higher than that 
in advanced economies—would reduce TFP by around 15% and output 
by 20% relative to an undistorted economy. This is a sizable effect in 
terms of lower productivity, wages and welfare but it falls very short of 
accounting for the distance between Venezuela and its US benchmark 
and, more importantly, it cannot account for lower capital accumulation 
or employment. Their second experiment, consisting of imposing a 
40% tax on output to the 70% most efficient firms, can explain less of 
the decline in productivity but its describes properly the lower capital 
accumulation of the Venezuelan economy after 1975 and estimates the 
output sacrifice ratio in around 33%. In their third and final experiment 
using the calibrated model they find that the combined policies of high 
entry costs and output taxes can account for over 90% of the observed 
differences in output between Venezuela and the US. 
3.5. mexico
All papers in this volume, as well as previous studies, point to the fact 
that growth rates in per-capita income during the period of import 
substitution were not markedly lower when compared to previous 
decades. Defendants of the import substitution strategy (ISS) adamantly 
exhibit these figures as evidence of sustained growth and structural 
transformation in the period as proof of its viability and success  
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of the ISS, pointing out the damaging consequences of protectionism, 
excess government intervention and price distortions (e.g., Bruton, 
1998). The successful experience of export-oriented strategies in East 
Asian countries provides additional support to reject the ISS.
Few attempts have been made to understand why some Latin American 
countries performed relatively well under the ISS. In general, it is 
claimed that the first phases of import-substitution are “easy” but 
no quantitative support to such claim is provided. Timothy Kehoe 
and Felipe Meza attempt to provide a solid-grounded, quantitative 
answer as to why income per working-age person grew faster in Mexico 
during the period of ISS than after the massive market liberalization 
of the reforms in the 1990s. The empirical results suggest that in 
early stages of ISS, i.e. between 1950 and 1970, Mexico experienced 
significant catch-up growth as the result of three factors: (a) massive 
migration of workers from rural to urban sectors that provided an ample 
labor supply, (b) far-reaching government intervention that induced 
significant—though not necessarily cost-effective—industrialization 
with massive, and (c) an important process of accumulation of human 
capital that increased labor productivity. Economic growth in Mexico 
during the early ISS stages was also the result of the adverse effects 
of the Big Depression: by 1933, GDP per capita was around 40% 
below its long-run trend. Kehoe and Meza argue that these strategies 
had already been exhausted by the 1980s, around the time when the 
Mexico started its pro-market reforms.
Kehoe and Meza’s theory is based on the notion that the useable stock 
of knowledge has increased very smoothly over the past century or more 
and that it can be adopted, perhaps at some cost, by countries that 
are behind the industrial leader. Such increase in knowledge induces, 
in equilibrium, a trend growth that they place at about two percent 
per year. However, the absolute level of income—measured as GDP 
per-working person—of a specific country relative to the industrial 
leader depends at any point in time on its institutions and economic 
policies. Changes in these institutions and key economic policies can 
cause depressions or booms. Eventually, however, if institutions and 
policies stabilize, and after capital and labor have adjusted, the country 
returns to trend growth. Mexico, as well as other countries in this 
volume, has had massive institutional shocks during the 20th century 
that have affected its income level, the ISS being a primary example 
(others include land reform and outbursts of political violence). Once 
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countries analyzed in this volume, have returned to trend and, not 
surprisingly, growth rates have returned to the long term benchmark.
4.  Lessons and open questions
The papers in this volume tend to agree that Latin America’s development 
problem is not one of factor accumulation, but of low productivity 
levels and anemic productivity gains. Empirical evidence collected by 
the authors suggests that physical capital and labor have not been 
a significant deterrent to economic growth. It is the misuse of such 
resources which is mainly to be blamed for the mediocre economic 
growth experienced throughout most of the independence period. 
In particular, they agree that TFP growth has been retarded in many 
ways by a variety of wrong policy choices. Chiefly among wrong policies 
are the import substitution strategy in which all countries embarked 
following the Great Depression with varying degree of enthusiasm, 
the fiscal irresponsibility that characterized public decision-making 
in different episodes, and the widespread intervention of the State in 
investment as well as production decisions,. Collectively, they seem to 
have had significant costs in terms of growth. At the same time, the 
adequate economic policies can set the stage for private investment 
to flourish and foster productivity gains and sustained economic 
growth as the case of Chile since the mid-1980s—and Mexico more 
recently—suggests. 
While most Latin American countries have suffered from the same 
malaise, the combination of external shocks and domestic policies 
and the timing of events in each country have been different. When 
trying to explain Latin America’s disappointing development path, 
this indicates that there may be several alternative explanations and 
a variety of channels at work. In turn, this call for economists to 
provide models and measurements that can weigh the relative merits 
of each hypothesis using a suitable framework. The papers in this 
volume make a compelling case for the need to base future research in 
quantitative, general equilibrium models: simple yet powerful models 
allow for rigorous testing and open space for new interpretation of 
the events. The empirical results provide useful measurements but 
are yet to be considered preliminary and partial answers to the broad 
question of the failure of development in Latin America. The issue 
certainly invites further research. In particular, there is an obvious 130 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 113–132
need for economists to find general explanations for the development 
problem from which the experience of each country would be but one 
realization. That would allow us to measure and compare the impact 
of each of these policies on factor accumulation, productivity gains 
and long run development. 
Beyond the measurement of the impact of external shocks and policies 
on long run growth and productivity, there is the issue of why Latin 
America has been stuck for so long in making bad policy choices 
(from the growth perspective) without straightening itself, while other 
regions of the planet have been capable of selecting adequate policies 
from the start or otherwise correcting those policies that proved 
wrong (particularly in East Asia). This question relates most likely 
to political and sociological elements that would require extending 
and enriching our standard economic models along these dimensions. 
The cases of Argentina and Venezuela are particularly shocking in this 
regard: having reached the levels of income per capita of developed 
nations 100 or 50 years ago respectively, they lost almost everything 
they had achieved in comparative terms. These countries not only 
made the wrong choices in the past, but according to the papers 
in this volume seem to be in a path of deepening, confirming, and 
consolidating their mistakes.
Buera et al.’s (2011) as well as Bello et al’s papers invite to further 
research and address the issue of why country leaders and politicians 
allowed and even fostered massive mismanagement of fiscal resources 
(from large budget deficits to poorly designed public investment 
projects). After all, unsustainable deficits and subsequent painful 
fiscal adjustments leading to economic turmoil had invariably been 
accompanied by dramatic political events that, one can argue, could 
have been easily anticipated. Modeling the interplay between the 
economic and political dimensions of economic policy is, perhaps, the 
necessary next step to provide a more comprehensive answer.131 R. Soto and F. Zurita | LATIN AMERICA AT ITS BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION
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